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ESTABLISHING INCREDIBLE EVENTS BY
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE: CIVIL SUITS
FOR ATRO CITIES THAT VIOLATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Russell J. Weintraubt
INTRODUCTION
Through the millennia, religious, racial, national, tribal,
and ethnic differences have set us at one another's throats.
When the manifestations of this hate descend to genocide,
murder, and torture, they may violate international law.' Two
international criminal tribunals are indicting and trying per-
sons accused of "serious violations of international humanitari-
an law" committed in Rwanda and neighboring states and in
the former Yugoslavia.2 One of the persons indicted by the
0 ©1996 Russell J. Weintraub. All Rights Reserved. The first portion of the
title is taken from ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NOENBERG CASE 10 (1947) (stating
"w]e must establish incredible events by credible evidence in a report to the
President of the United States by Chief Counsel for the United States in the
prosecution of the principal Axis war criminals).
t Professor of Law and holder of the John B. Connally Chair in Civil
Jurisprudence, University of Texas School of Law, B-A., 1950, New York
University;, J.D., 1953, Harvard University. The author thanks Jennifer Harris for
her very helpful research assistance.
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMEN] (listing "piracy, slave trade, at-
tacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism" as "offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern"); id. § 702 (stating that a "state violates international law if, as a matter
of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones" listed practices, including
"genocide," "murder or causing the disappearance of individuals," and "torture or
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment"). One of the issues
that this Article addresses is whether these actions violate international law when
practiced by persons who do not operate under color of state authority. See infra
notes 14-16, 38-39, 116 and accompanying text.
I See James Podgers, The World Cries for Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996 at 52,
55. The tribunals were created by resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council. The Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is sitting in The Hague, Nether-
lands, and the Tribunal for Rwanda convenes in three cities in RwandaoArusha,
Tanzania and KegalL Id. The competence of the International Tribunal for the
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
Radovan Karadzic,3 is also a defendant in suits in the Second
Circuit brought by victims of atrocities for which he is alleged
to be responsible.4 These suits, seeking a civil remedy in dam-
ages, are the focus of this Article.
The plaintiffs in these suits "allege that they are victims,
and representatives of victims, of various atrocities, including
brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation,
torture, and summary execution, carried out by Bosnian-Serb
military forces as part of a genocidal campaign conducted in
the course of the Bosnian civil war."5 The scene for these
events is the former Yugoslavia. In 1992, the Croats and Mus-
lims of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted to form an independent na-
tion.' Serbs living in this area boycotted the referendum and
claimed two-thirds of the territory as their country. Karadzic is
the self-proclaimed president of this entity, called "Srpska."
Srpska is not recognized by other nations or by the United
Nations. Karadzic is alleged to have ordered and directed a
campaign of "ethnic cleansing" designed to eliminate Croat and
Muslim residents from Srpska by killing them and driving
them into exile. Tactics included massacres, murders, torture,
and, as an integral part of the scheme, rape. Approximately
20,000 Muslim and Croat women were raped by Serb soldiers.
Many of these women were subjected to repeated gang rapes
and forced to give birth to children thus conceived.
Former Yugoslavia is limited to "the power to prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law" and does not include civil
compensation. Statute of the Yugoslavian Tribunal art. 1, contained in the Report
of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1159, 1170.
See Podgers, supra note 2, at 55, 58.
' See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2524 (1996). For a suit against a Rwandan political leader accused of atrocities
there, see Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 WL 164496
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages).
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
For short accounts of these background events, see Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F.
Supp. 734, 736-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); Michele Brandt, Comment, Doe
v. Karadzic: Redressing Non-State Acts of Gender-Specific Abuse Under the Alien
Tort Statute, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1416-20 (1995); Podgers, supra note 2, at 54-
55.
[V7ol. 62: 753
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Two actions were brought against Karadzic in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to
recover compensatory and punitive damages. One action was
brought by "Jane Doe" plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and
members of their class. The other action was brought by "S.K."
"on her own behalf and on behalf of her infant sons."7 Jurisdic-
tion was founded primarily on the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA) 8 and the Torture Victim Protection Act ('TVPA")
The ATCA, which was part of the first Judiciary Act, in
1789,10 provides: "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."" The TVPA was enacted in 1992 and provides that
"[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation... subjects an individual to
torture... or... to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action
be liable for damages ... ."' The district court dismissed the
actions under the ATCA on the ground that acts of private
individuals do not violate "the law of nations" and dismissed
the TVPA claims because Karadzic did not act under color of
law.'4 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further
' Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 734-36.
"28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) [hereinafter ATCAI. This statute is sometimes re-
ferred to as the "Alien Tort Act," Kadirc, 70 F.3d at 236, or as the "Alien Tort
Claim Act." Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 735. 'Alien Tort Claims ActV is the form in
which the statute is listed in the Popular Name Table of U.S.C. Annotated.
U.S.CA GENERAL INDEX, U to Z, at 848 (West 1996).
Other bases asserted for jurisdiction were federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) and "the principles of supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367." Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 735.
' Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp.
V 1993) [hereinafter TVPA].
10 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77.
The original enactment provided that this jurisdiction was "concurrent with
the courts of the several States." Id. This language was deleted in subsequent
codifications, but because the statute does not provide for exclusive federal court
jurisdiction, state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction. See Forti v. Suarez.Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. CaL
1988); William &. Caste, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Wrolation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REv. 467, 468 n.4
(1986).
' See supra note 9.
TVPA § 2(a).
*' Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739 (ATCA), 741 (TVPA), 743 (rejecting
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331) (S.D.N.Y. 1994), reu'd sub
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proceedings, 5 holding that private individuals who commit
war crimes violate international law and can be held civilly
liable for this violation. 6 Moreover, plaintiffs' allegations
were sufficient to entitle them either "to prove that Karadzic's
regime satisfies the criteria for a state, for purposes of those
international law violations requiring state action,"17 or "that
Karadzic acted under color of law of Yugoslavia by acting in
concert with Yugoslav officials or with significant Yugoslavian
aid.,,8
This Article first summarizes in more detail the district
court and Second Circuit opinions in the suits against
Karadzic. Part Two discusses whether the cryptic ATCA should
be construed broadly to create a civil cause of action for all
violations of international law, or narrowly to provide a reme-
dy in only one or a few instances. Part Three addresses wheth-
er, if Congress has provided aliens with a remedy for harm
inflicted abroad, it has conferred jurisdiction on federal courts
in violation of the limits on 'judicial Power" in Article III,
section 2, of the Constitution. 9 Part Four analyzes the ques-
tion of judicial abstention-if federal courts have jurisdiction
over such cases, should the courts nevertheless decline to exer-
cise it under doctrines such as act of state, sovereign immuni-
ty, political question, and forum non conveniens? Part Five
discusses choice-of-law issues-ifjurisdiction is exercised, what
law applies to determine the elements of harm that are com-
pensable and how damages should be measured? The Article
concludes that the ATCA and TVPA validly confer judicial
power, but that the exercise of this power is likely to interfere
with executive and legislative functions in the conduct of for-
eign policy. Nevertheless, in the absence of an international
tribunal to adjudicate the tort claims of victims, the ATCA and
TVPA are flawed but viable means of providing compensation
and documenting atrocities.
nom. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996).
16 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996).
16 Id. at 242-43.
' Id. at 245.
I d.
" U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
[Vol. 62: 753
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I. THE SECOND CIRCuIT SUITS AGAINST RADOVAN KARADZIC
Two actions were filed against Karadzic in the Southern
District of New York. The class action by the Doe plaintiffs
sought damages on behalf of all persons who were victims of
"torts inflicted by Bosnian-Serb military forces under the com-
mand of defendant."2" The wrongs alleged included "genocide,
war crimes, summary execution, wrongful death, torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, assault and battery, rape
and intentional infliction of emotional harm."" In a second
action, S.K sued alleging "that she had witnessed the murder
of her son, the burning of her home, and that she was repeat-
edly raped" under defendant's "order and direction."m
Karadzic was served with process while in New York at
the invitation of the United Nations to explore the possibility
of ending the civil war in Bosnia.s Without reaching the issue
of whether this service was sufficient to confer personal juris-
diction, Judge Leisure dismissed both suits for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.' He noted that if the United States rec-
ognized the Bosnian-Serb entity, Karadzic would be entitled to
immunity from suit and that this future possibility, "while not
dispositive at this point in the litigation, militates against this
Court exercising jurisdiction ... ."' He then held that the
court did not have jurisdiction under the ATCA 0 because the
actions by Karadzic were not under color of the law of any
recognized state and thus not "in violation of the law of na-
tions" as required by that Act.' The TVPA' therefore cer-
tainly did not provide jurisdiction because it expressly "only ex-
20 Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), reu'd. sub nom
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
21 Id.
2 Id. at 736-37.
2s Kadic, 70 F.3d at 247.
24 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232 [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Brief] (stating that the judge dismissed when the only issue briefed was
personal jurisdiction and without providing the parties an opportunity to be heard
on subject matter jurisdiction). I thank Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon, counsel
for Kadic, who provided me with a copy of the briefE
Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 738. Karadzic would be immune from suit because he
would be a head of state. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8, 10-11 and accompanying text.
Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 738-41.
See supra notes 9, 12-13 and accompanying text.
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tends to actions carried out under the authority or color of law
of an entity recognized by the United States as a foreign na-
tion."29 Judge Leisure also declined jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331,30 which confers jurisdiction over actions "aris-
ing under" the "laws" of the United States. Although "substan-
tive international law is incorporated into the law of the Unit-
ed States,""l he did not find "an implied right" of a civil action
for violation of the law of nations.3 2 Moreover, as he had pre-
viously held, acts not under color of state law did not violate
international law.3" Finally, because all federal claims had
been dismissed, Judge Leisure dismissed plaintiffs' pendent
non-federal claims.'
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.35 The court held that Filartiga v. Pena-Irala6
had established as the law of the circuit that the ATCA pro-
vided a civil cause of action; that "the law of nations" is to be
applied as it has evolved to the present, not as it existed in
1789 when the Act was first adopted; and that international
law now applies to a country's treatment of its own citizens.
The court made new law for the circuit when it held that "the
Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 741.
3' 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
31 Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 742.
" Id. at 743.
-3 Id.
" Id. at 744.
" Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
3' 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, two citizens of Paraguay brought
suit under the ATCA against another citizen of Paraguay. The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant, while a Paraguayan police official, caused the death by torture
of Joelito Filartiga, who was the son of one plaintiff and the brother of the other.
The Second Circuit held that official torture, even of a country's own citizens,
violates international law, id. at 884-85, and that the ATCA provided plaintiffs
with a civil cause of action to recover for this violation. Id. at 887. The court also
held that as so construed, the ATCA did not violate Article III of the Constitution.
Id. at 885-89. In Doe v. Karadzic, the district court held that Filartiga should not
be extended to permit suit for "acts committed by non-state actors." 866 F. Supp.
at 739.
31 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238-39. For the holding that international law includes a
country's treatment of its own citizens, see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884; see also 2
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, pt. VII, Introductory Note at 144-45 (noting "general
acceptance ... that how a state treats . . . its own citizens, in respect of their
human rights, is not the state's own business alone . . .but is a matter of inter-
national concern and a proper subject for regulation by international law").
[Vol. 62:753
19961 CIVIL SUITS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNWATIONAL LAW 759
alleged atrocities are actionable under the Alien Tort Act,
without regard to state action, to the extent that they were
committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes .... "3
The court did conclude that "torture and summary execu-
tion-when not perpetrated in the course of genocide or war
crimes-are proscribed by international law only when commit-
ted by state officials or under color of law."' For torture and
execution claims, plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to enti-
tle them "to prove that Srpska satisfies the definition of a state
for purposes of international law violations and, alternatively,
that Karadzic acted in concert with the recognized state of the
former Yugoslavia and its constituent republic, Serbia."0 In
order for an entity to be a "state" for these purposes, it is not
necessary that it be recognized by other states.4' "Moreover, it
is likely that the state action concept, where applicable to some
violations like 'official' torture, requires merely the semblance
of official authority."42
As for service of process on Karadzic, the court held that if
he was served in the Southern District, he was not immune
from service even though he had been invited to negotiations
at the United Nations. Under the terms of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement, Karadzic was properly served be-
cause he was not served in the United Nations "headquarters
district," was not a representative of any United Nations mem-
ber, and service did not impede his "transit to or from the
headquarters district" as an invitee on official business.
' Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244; see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Edwards, J., concur-
ring) (stating that international law proscribes some acts by individuals, such as
piracy).
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243.
oId. at 244; see Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. CIV.A94-3627, 1996 WL
164496, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (finding that a political leader who was not
a government official acted as "part of a coordinated, genocidal effort with officials
of the Rwandan government and thus .. . under color of law"); Claire Finkelstein,
Changing Notions of State Agency in International Law: The Case of Paul Touuier,
30 TE. INT'L L.J. 261 (1995) (stating that although 'piracy has been considered
jus cogens, and more recently, the Genocide Convention and various terrorism
treaties authorize international prosecutions against individuals without regard to
their relation to a state... the state agency requirement remains the central
vehicle for distinguishing domestic from international offense").
41 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
42Id.
IId. at 247. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-
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The court then held that there was no reason to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. First, the
decision was not barred by the "political question" doctrine,
under which a court will decline to decide issues more properly
determined by the executive or legislative branches.
The court enumerated the factors listed by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr" as signaling a non-justiciable politi-
cal question and held that none of them applied. The issue was
constitutionally committed to the courts, not "to a coordinate
political department."45 International law provided 'judicially
discoverable and manageable standards" for adjudication, so
that there was no need for "an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."46 There was no likeli-
hood that assuming jurisdiction would conflict with policy
decisions or statements of the Executive. The court had asked
the Attorney General to express her views, and the response, a
"Statement of Interest" signed by the Solicitor General and the
State Department's Legal Adviser, stated that this case was
not an occasion for invoking the "political question" doctrine."
Nor was the matter non-justiciable under the "act of state
doctrine." 8 Under that doctrine, United States courts refrain
from examining the validity of the acts of a foreign sovereign
within its own territory. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino49 is the source of modern understanding of the act
of state doctrine. In that case, Cuba had expropriated without
compensation Cuban sugar factories owned by United States
citizens. When proceeds of the sale of sugar from these facto-
ries were located in the United States, the former owners
claimed that the expropriation violated international law and
that they, not Cuba, were entitled to the money.
In older cases, the act of state doctrine had been explained
on the basis of international comity and tranquillity.0 In
Ghali, did request diplomatic immunity from service for Karadzic. See Jean-Marie
Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INTVL L.J. 1,
32 n.183 (1993).
" 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249.
46 Id.
" Id. at 250.
" Id.
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
50 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
[Vol. 62: 753
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Sabbatino, Justice Harlan emphasized the pragmatic aspects
of the doctrine. If a foreign country misbehaved and caused
financial or physical injury to United States citizens, the Exec-
utive and Congress had many methods of dealing with the
problem, including diplomatic negotiations, "submission to the
United Nations," and the "employment of economic and politi-
cal sanctions.""' If such measures did not work, there was lit-
tle likelihood that the courts could correct the matter by adju-
dicating a handful of cases involving the foreign sovereign's
conduct.5 2 Worse, the judiciary might embarrass and impede
the diplomatic efforts of the political branches of govern-
ment.' Harlan therefore held that "the Judicial Branch will
not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own
territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recog-
nized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles ... ."' Application of the act of state doctrine
depends on "the degree of codification or consensus concerning
a particular area of international law,... the implications of
the issue for our foreign relations, [and whether] the govern-
ment which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer
in existence ... ."' Under these standards, Justice Harlan
thought Sabbatino a clear case for judicial abstention. There
was not even an international consensus on the propriety of
expropriation without compensation.'6
The act of state doctrine did not preclude adjudication in
Kadic because the defendant "has not had the temerity to
assert in this Court that the acts he allegedly committed are
the officially approved policy of a state."7 Even if he did, the
doctrine would not preclude suit because unlike the expropria-
tion in Sabbatino, the acts alleged here clearly would violate
international law.'
", Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431.
52 Id.
"Id. at 432.
4Id. at 428.
5Id.
" Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429-30.
7 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
58 Id.
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Finally, there was no basis for a forum non conveniens
dismissal because "at this stage of the litigation no party has
identified a more suitable forum.... [T]he courts of the former
Yugoslavia, either in Serbia or war-torn Bosnia, are not now
available to entertain plaintiffs' claims .... ""
On remand, District Judge Leisure ruled that the Doe
plaintiffs validly served process despite the fact that special
agents protecting Karadzic prevented actual handing of the
papers to the defendant." The judge also held that answer
and discovery in both the Doe and Kadic actions should not
await the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States
on defendant's petition for certiorari.6'
II. CONSTRUCTION OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Was Filartiga62 correct in construing the ATCA to provide
a civil cause of action in federal court to any alien who was
tortiously injured abroad by any act that violated international
law, as that law has evolved to the present? The legislative
history of the first Judiciary Act casts no light on the Act's pur-
poses. Judge Friendly has famously said of the Act: "This old
but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it
has been with us since the first Judiciary Act, no one seems to
know whence it came."63
Before Filartiga opened the floodgates, only twice in al-
most 200 years had jurisdiction under the Act been upheld.'
59 Id.
6' Doe v. Karadzic, Nos. CIVA.93-0878 & CIVA.93-1163, 1996 WL 194298, at
*1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1996).
:' Id. at *2. Certiorari has been denied. 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
62 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For discussion of Filartiga, see supra notes 36-
37 and accompanying text.
' IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that fraud,
although universally condemned, does not violate international law). Lohengrin is
the eponymous hero of an opera by Richard Wagner, which was first performed in
1850. When a duke's daughter is accused of murder, a mysterious stranger ap-
pears to defend her in trial by combat. Comparison to Lohengrin should not be
welcome to advocates of broad use of the Act. When Lohengrin's identity and ori-
gin are eventually revealed, he sails away, never to be seen again. See Thomas
Grey, Classics World, Opera Stories and Background, Lohengrin,
www.classicalmus.com\bmgclassics\opera\lohengrin-e.html. For the Lohengrin leg-
end on which Wagner based his opera, see 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 450 (15th
ed. 1985).
" Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D. Md. 1961) (upholding jurisdiction in
[Vol. 62: 753
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Since then, the Aces jurisdiction has been invoked successfully
in a large and growing number of suits.' Some judges, how-
ever, have limited the Act to a narrow compass. In his concur-
ring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,' Judge
Bork would allow suits under the Act only for violations of
international law that might have been in the mind of Con-
gress in 1789-violations of safeconducts, infringements of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracyY Before becoming a Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court, Judge Scalia wrote that the Act
"may conceivably have been meant to cover only private, non-
governmental acts that are contrary to treaty or the law of na-
tions-the most prominent examples being piracy and assaults
upon ambassadors.' Some law review articles have also
suit over custody of child on ground that the mother's movement of the child
under an improper passport violated international law and noting that "[dle3pite
its age, only six cases and one opinion of Attorney General Bonaparte are cited in
the annotations [to the Act]"); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (us-
ing the Act, along with admiralty, as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit for restitu-
tion of cargo on board a Spanish ship seized as a prize of war); Jeffrey M. Blum
& Ralph G. Steinhardt, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 55 (1981) (citing these cases as
the only ones before Filartiga that sustained jurisdiction under the Act).
' See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming
award of compensatory and punitive damages against former Ethiopian official); In
re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995) (affirming an order enjoining the estate of the
former Philippine President from transferring or otherwise disposing of assets dur-
ing litigation); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972 (1993) (affixming a default judgment against
the former Philippine President's daughter for death by torture); Musbildwabo v.
Barayagwiza, No. CIVA94-3627, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996)
(awarding compensatory and punitive damages against Rwandan political leader);
Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding compensatory and puni-
tive damages against former Haitian military ruler); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages against
former Guatemalan Minister of Defense); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying
in part former Argentine general's motion to dismiss).
" 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), certL denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (dismissing,
in a per curiam opinion, a suit brought against the Libyan Arab Republic, the
Palestine Liberation Organization and several other Arab organizations to recover
for an attack on civilians in Israel).
Id. at 813 (citing 4 Sm WLUIAM BLACKSTONE, CoImENTAmIES ON THE LAs
OF ENGLAND 68, 72 (Garland Publishing 1978)).
0 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing
a suit by members of Congress, citizens of Nicaragua and two Florida residents
against President Reagan and others for claims arising out of United States sup-
port of anti-government guerrillas in Nicaragua).
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urged restricting jurisdiction under the Act, 9 while other arti-
cles and comments have applauded Filartiga's broad interpre-
tation.7"
Professor Sweeney has advocated the narrowest construc-
tion of the Act. In time of war, under the law of prize, United
States warships and authorized private vessels could stop
apparently neutral vessels to determine whether an intercept-
ed ship was in fact neutral, or was attempting to aid the ene-
my. Professor Sweeney contends that "tort" applies only to
wrongs done to person or property on neutral vessels stopped
under the law of prize.7 After Professor Sweeney's article was
published, Karadzic moved for a rehearing seeking to give the
Act Sweeney's restrictive interpretation. The motion was de-
nied on the ground that "Professor Sweeney's argument is
69 See Simon, supra note 43, at 34 (stating that "Congress intended the statute
to give foreigners the ability to sue U.S. citizens, not fellow aliens, for law of
nations violations"); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law
of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 445, 447, 453-67 (1995) (stating
that the Act was intended to cover only torts committed in violation of the law of
prize when United States war vessels search neutral merchant vessels).
70 See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 64, at 112-13; Anne-Marie Burley, The
Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
IIWL L. 461, 488 (1989) (stating that "understanding the Statute as fulfilling a
more general duty under the law of nations evokes a positive spirit supporting an
expansive reading of its letter"); Jorge Cicero, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 as a
Remedy for Injuries to Foreign Nationals Hosted by the United States, 23 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 315, 360 (1991) (stating that international law should be inter-
preted as it has evolved); David Cole et al., Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute:
Amicus Curiae Memorandum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in
Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 16 (1988) (stating that
the Act was "designed to direct cases involving issues of foreign relations and
international law into the federal judiciary"); Tom Lininger, Overcoming Immunity
Defenses to Human Rights Suits in U.S. Courts, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 177, 178
(1994) (stating that civil litigation in U.S. courts "can achieve several significant
results"); Helen C. Lucas, Comment, The Adjudication of Violations of International
Law under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Allowing Alien Plaintiffs Their Day in Fed-
eral Court, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 232 (1987) (proposing "a broad construction"
of the Act); Andrew M. Scoble, Comment, Enforcing the Customary International
Law of Human Rights in Federal Court, 74 CAL. L. REV. 127, 128 (1986) (stating
that the Act "must be construed to encompass those customary rules that have
evolved since passage of the statute and that may evolve in the future"); cf. Caste,
supra note 11, at 525 (stating that the Act should be construed broadly to enable
federal courts to shape a "uniform national approach" to the "appropriate limits" of
litigation under it).
71 See Sweeney, supra note 69, at 447.
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interesting but far from conclusive."72 Moreover, Filartiga"
had established that the Act "has a broad scope" and Congress
codified this understanding of the ATCA when it enacted the
TVPAJ 4
One reason advanced for giving the Act a narrow interpre-
tation is that judgments rendered under it are probably uncol-
lectible. The defendant is likely to be impecunious or to have
fled the United States leaving no assets here.7' Even the judg-
ment against the large Marcos estate78 will present difficul-
ties in collection. The Philippine Government "has taken the
position it is entitled to the entire estate because the money
was looted from the people of the Philippines."' There are,
however, reasons other than compensation of the victims for
suits under the ATCA. Suits under the Act deprive a perpetra-
tor of atrocities of safe haven in the United States.78 It is also
important, as the title of this Article suggests, to establish the
facts and vindicate the claims of the victims.79 In addition, as
Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996).
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
' Kaidic, 74 F.3d at 378. For discussion of the effect of the TVPA on construc-
tion of the ATCA, see infra notes 81-87, 91-93 and accompanying text.
"' See Mark Curriden, U.S. Justice for Abuses Abroad, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at
20 (stating that the defendant in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir.
1996), characterized the $1.5 million judgment against him as a "jokW' because he
has no money"); Simon, supra note 43, at 28 (stating "while most cases co far
have resulted in default judgments for the plaintiffs, none of the damages award-
ed .. . has never [sic] been collected").
" In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995) (affirming an award of $L2 billion
in exemplary damages); In re Estate of Marcos, No. 94-840, 1994 WL 874222, at
*105 (D. Haw. Jan. 3, 1995, addendum Jan. 4, 1996) (recommending $767,491,493
in compensatory damages).
7 Arleen Jacobius, Collection Next Step for Marcos Victims, A.B_. J., Apr.
1995, at 24, 25. For the Philippine Government's suit against Marco3, see Republic
of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1035 (1989).
"' See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 64, at 113; Curriden, supra note 75, at
20; Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789: Lessons
from In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 491, 501
(1993); Jacobius, supra note 77, at 25; Lininger, supra note 70, at 178.
"' See Hope Vmer Samborn, Ruling Could Lead to More Human Rights Torts
Cases, A.BA. J., Dec. 1995, at 30 (quoting Beth Stephens, counsel for the Doe
plaintiffs in Kadic, that the plaintiffs 'feel it is important to receive a judgment
that vindicates them in the public eye).
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Kadic itself demonstrates, suits under the Act assist in the
development of international law. 0
Moreover, although the TVPA81 did not codify Filartiga's
"broad reading" of the ATCA, as the Second Circuit asserted in
Kadic,82 the TVPA and its legislative history do undermine
arguments that suits by aliens for atrocities committed abroad
should be kept from our courts by construing the ATCA as
narrowly as possible. The TVPA expressly establishes a civil
cause of action for victims of torture and for legal representa-
tives of victims of extrajudicial killing.' The Report of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
states that the purpose of the bill is "to provide a Federal
cause of action against any individual who [commits the pro-
scribed wrongs] under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation .... " The Report refers to Judge
Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren' and states that the TVPA is in-
tended explicitly to provide the civil cause of action he denied,
and that suits for violations of international law not covered by
the TVPA should be permitted under the ATCA.8" The Report
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary contains a similar
statement concerning the effect of the TVPA and the continued
viability of the ATCA.87
80 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 78, at 501.
81 See supra notes 9, 12-13 and accompanying text.
Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996). The TVPA left the ATCA
intact and provided a new cause of action for official torture. If anything, this
would undermine the argument that the ATCA was sufficient for this purpose, The
legislative history of the TVPA reveals agreement with Filartiga's construction of
the ATCA and a desire to enact new legislation that places beyond doubt that
there is a civil cause of action for harm inflicted by official torture. See infra
notes 84-87.
" TVPA, supra note 9, § 2. But cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091(d) (punishment for crime
of genocide, created by the section, applies only if the offense is committed in the
United States or the alleged offender is a United States national), 1092 (1994)
(creation of criminal penalties for genocide shall not "be construed as creating any
substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any proceed-
ing-).
84 H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1991) [hereinafter
House Report].
5 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). For discussion of Judge Bork's opinion, see supra notes
66-67 and accompanying text.
8' House Report, supra note 84, at 4.
87 S. REP. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991) [hereinafter Senate Report].
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The TVPA is both broader and narrower than the ATCA.
The TVPA extends a cause of action to United States citizens,
whereas the ATCA is limited to alien plaintiffs.' The ATCA
permits suit for any tort in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States, whereas the TVPA is limited to
torture and extrajudicial killing.'
Although both the House and Senate reports make it clear
that the ATCA is not superseded by the TVPA, ' it would
have been preferable to amend the ATCA instead of enacting a
separate TVPA. Nevertheless, Congress has made it clear that
it approves of Filartiga's broad reading of the ATCA.91 The
only viable jurisdictional questions that remain are whether,
as so construed, the ATCA confers power on federal courts in
violation of the limits imposed in Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution, 2 and whether the Act violates what Judge Bork
has termed "the constitutional core of the political question
doctrine." 3 The same questions apply to the express grant of
jurisdiction in the TVPA.
I. Do THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE TORTURE VICTIM
PROTECTION ACT EXCEED ARTICLE Il LIMITS ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION?
Article Il of the Constitution sets out the limits of the
subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. The validity of the
ATCA and the TVPA turns on the scope of the "arising under"
provision: 'The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority ... ."' Filartiga95 dismissed an Article
Il attack on the ATCA, stating "[tihe constitutional basis for
See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text
"I Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For discussion of
Filartiga, see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
'U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2 (stating the extent of the 'judicial Power' of federal
courts).
' Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1995).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
"See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always
been part of the federal common law."" This is the same ba-
sis on which numerous federal courts,97 commentators" and
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary9 have rejected Article
III objections to the ATCA or the TVPA.
Ironically, Filartiga raised an issue of subject matter juris-
diction that was not a problem. The court addressed the ques-
tion of whether "arising under" jurisdiction would be lost if on
remand it were decided that Paraguayan tort law applied to
determine compensation for death by torture in that country,
stating:
Such a decision would not retroactively oust the federal court of
subject matter jurisdiction, even though plaintiffs cause of action
would no longer properly be "created" by a law of the United States.
Once federal jurisdiction is established by a colorable claim under
federal law at a preliminary stage of the proceeding, subsequent
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1474 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995); Mushikiwabo v.
Barayagwiza, No. CIVA.94-3627, 1996 WL 164496, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9,
1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180 (D. Mass. 1995); cf. Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "we need not rule defini-
tively on whether any causes of action not specifically authorized by statute may
be implied by international law standards as incorporated into United States law
and grounded on section 1331 [28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)] jurisdiction"); I1T v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that "[t]he reference to
the law of nations must be narrowly read if the [ATCA] is to be kept within the
confines of Article II" and rejecting a contention that securities fraud violates
international law). But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 822 (Bork, J., concurring) (stating
that "[sihould such an improbable statute [such as the TVPA expressly conferring
a civil cause of action] come into existence, it will be time to ask whether the
constitutional core of the political question doctrine precludes jurisdiction" and
indicating that if he could rule unrestrained by precedent, he would hold that the
doctrine "bars this or any similar action").
9' See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 64, at 99-100; Casto, supra note 11, at
511; Lucas, supra note 70, at 248; Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of
Filartiga- Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 70 (1995).
' See Senate Report, supra note 87, at 5. The Report finds an alternative
basis for congressional power to enact the TVPA in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, which
empowers Congress to "define and punish ... offenses against the Law of Na-
tions." Senate Report, supra note 87, at 5-6. But see Senate Report, supra note 87,
at 13-14 (minority views of Senators Simpson & Grassley) (arguing that the power
to define crimes in Article I, section 8 may not extend to creating a civil cause of
action, and that "arising under" jurisdiction may not extend to violations of inter-
national law that have no nexus with the United States).
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dismissal of that claim (here, the claim under the general interna-
tional proscription of torture) does not deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion previously established."2
There was no need to invoke the "colorable claim" doctrine,
which is applicable to pendent jurisdiction over non-federal
claims after a court has dismissed all federal claims.' "Aris-
ing under" jurisdiction permits Congress to channel to federal
courts an issue in which there is a compelling federal interest,
even though state or foreign law determines rights and rem-
edies. 2 It is this interest in conferring on federal courts ju-
risdiction over cases that affect United States foreign relations
that ultimately must rebut Article III objections to ATCA and
TVPA in cases lacking any nexus with the United States.'"
The Supreme Court has held the presence of federal inter-
ests sufficient to confer Article III jurisdiction. In Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,'4 the Court rejected an Arti-
cle III attack on permitting a suit between two foreign parties
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").'" The
Court adverted to the danger of opening federal courts to
claims by anyone in the world against a foreign sovereign and
noted that "Congress protected against this danger not by
restricting the class of potential plaintiffs, but rather by enact-
ing substantive provisions requiring some form of substantial
" Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 n.25 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omit-
ted). For discussion of choice of law under ATCA and TVPA, see infra Part V.
... See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3567.1, at 114-66 (1984).
102 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SysTEm 744-45 (1953) (discussing "protective jurisdiction'); Paul J.
ishhin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
192 (1953) (stating that "[w]here there is an articulated and active federal policy
regulating a field, the 'arising under' clause of Article I apparently permits the
conferring of jurisdiction on the national courts of all cases in the area-including
those substantively governed by state lav).
1" See Cole et al., supra note 70, at 16 (discussing the interest in directing
"cases involving issues of foreign relations and international law into the federal
judiciary"); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Para-
digm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 411 (1988) (stating that "[clourts may invoke protec-
tive jurisdiction legitimately over human rights claims because the cases implicate
clear and unique foreign policy interests").
104 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
'- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1994). For discussion of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see infra Part M.D.
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contact with the United States.""0 6 There was, however, one
exception. The Act provided jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign that had waived its immunity.10 7 The Court carefully left
open the question of 'whether, by waiving its immunity, a
foreign state could consent to suit based on activities wholly
unrelated to the United States." °8 In this part of its opinion,
however, the Court was addressing the issue of construction of
the FSIA, not its constitutionality. When the Court turned to
Article III, it found that Congress had properly exercised its
power to confer jurisdiction on federal courts because "[aictions
against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues
concerning the foreign relations of the United States, and the
primacy of federal concerns is evident."" 9
Moreover, international law recognizes "universal jurisdic-
tion" -to define and punish certain offenses such as "piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, [and]
war crimes" which are "recognized by the community of na-
tions as of universal concern."" "Universal jurisdiction" can
be exercised "although the state has no links of territory with
the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even the
victim).""' International law also permits a state to provide a
civil remedy for the offenses that justify universal criminal
jurisdiction."' Article III should not deny federal courts juris-
diction to do what international law regards as permissible.
Otherwise the foreign relations of the United States might be
adversely affected if this country could not comply with its
obligation to the community of nations to seize and prosecute
enemies of mankind.
IV. DocTRiNEs OF JuDIcIAL ABSTENTION
Federal courts are not required to exercise their jurisdic-
tion over civil actions brought to redress a growing list of viola-
tions of international law. Under self-imposed doctrines of
100 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 490.
Id. at 490 n.15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994)).
I08 d.
19 Id. at 493.
"' RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 404.
... RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 404, at cmt. a.
112 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 404, at cmt. b.
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abstention, such as act of state, political question, and forum
non conveniens, federal courts can decline to decide cases over
which they have jurisdiction. Courts are also barred from en-
tertaining suits against foreign sovereigns except as permitted
under the FSIA."
A. Act of State
The act of state doctrine poses a minor dilemma"' for
suits under the ATOA and TVPA. If the acts are officially ap-
proved, the doctrine applies." If the acts are not officially
approved, the wrong may not violate international law when
that law requires that the defendant act in an official rather
than private capacity. Kadic diminished the problem by ruling
that a person acting in an individual capacity violates interna-
tional law when committing genocide or war crimes, but held
that "torture and summary execution-when not perpetrated
in the course of genocide or war crimes-are proscribed by
international law only when committed by state officials or
under color of law." 6 A state official, however, can act con-
trary to law but "under color of law." As the court said in
Filartiga," "Paraguay's renunciation of torture as a legiti-
mate instrument of state policy, however, does not strip the
tort [fatal use of torture by a high police official] of its char-
acter as an international law violation, if it in fact occurred
under color of government authority."" 8
It is unlikely that a state will declare that acts such as
torture and extrajudicial killing are officially approved and
thus throw the state-action cloak around its official." Even
,13 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (1994).
" See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 64, at 108 (stating that "[s]uperficiaily,
the act of state doctrine poses a dilemma to plaintiffs seeking to enforce human
rights under § 1350").
11 For discussion of the act of state doctrine, see supra notes 48-88 and accom-
panying text.
116 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995).
" See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
11 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
1 See Senate Report, supra note 87, at 8 (stating that [s]ince [the act of state
doctrine] applies only to 'public! acts, and no state commits torture as a matter of
public policy, this doctrine cannot shield former officials from liability under this
legislation"); cf. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) (holding that the act of state doc-
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if a state did give its imprimatur to the atrocities, the act of
state doctrine should not prevent suit. One of the factors de-
termining application of the doctrine is "the degree of codifica-
tion or consensus concerning a particular area of international
law."' o There is a consensus that torture and extrajudicial
killing violate international law,'12' and a state that embraces
them is an outlaw.
B. Political Question
The heart of the political question doctrine is the notion of
separation of powers. 22 The concept is that courts should not
deal with issues that, like the conduct of foreign policy, are
constitutionally committed to other branches of govern-
ment.'" Yet Baker v. Carr,"4 the fountainhead of modern
understanding of the political question doctrine, itself suggests
a nuanced approach to cases that might affect foreign policy:
[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this
field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the partic-
ular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by
the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the
light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possi-
ble consequences of judicial action. 2'
Nevertheless, even under an approach to the political question
doctrine that is sensitive to the circumstances of each case,
"[t]here is no more complex and sensitive issue between coun-
tries than human rights."'26 Judge Bork believed that except
for a small category of offenses-such as violation of
safeconducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
trine does not apply when a state sues its deposed leader).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995).See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (stating that "adjudication of appellants' claims would pres-
ent great separation of powers problems"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
12 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
124 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The case rejected the contention that allegations of a
denial of equal protection by failure to reapportion the Tennessee General Assem-
bly presented a political question and therefore were not justiciable.
L Id. at 211-12.
12 Senate Report, supra note 87, at 15 (minority views of Senators Simpson
and Grassley).
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piracy-which posed no threat to foreign relations, suits under
the ATCA should be precluded by "the constitutional core of
the political question doctrine."' Judge Robb wrote that the
doctrine precluded entry "into so sensitive an area of foreign
policy."in
In Kadic, the Court invited the Executive branch to ex-
press its views. In response, a "Statement of Interest," submit-
ted by the Solicitor General and the Legal Adviser to the De-
partment of State, concluded that "dismissal of these cases at
this stage under the 'political question' doctrine is not warrant-
ed" and that "[alithough there might be instances in which
federal courts are asked to issue rulings under the Alien Tort
Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act that might raise a
political question, this is not one of them."' The words "at
this stage" suggest that the Executive's views might change in
light of future events. Moreover, as Professor Simon noted,
"[flollowing service, Karadzic left the United States immediate-
ly and refused to return, complicating the U.N. negotiations
and certainly raising a question of court interference in foreign
policy, indeed matters of war and peace."12
Perhaps in ATCA and TVPA cases the shoals of the politi-
cal question can be avoided if, as in Kadic, the court requests
and receives assurances from the Executive that dismissal is
not warranted. There is an analogous exception to the act of
state doctrine, the "Bernstein exception. " 3' The Supreme
Court has left open the question of whether the Bernstein ex-
ception is valid. 2 Moreover, the exception was applied to a
despised regime that had been expunged by the armed forces
of the United States and its allies. There was no possibility
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring), cerL denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
"' Id. at 827 (Robb, J., concurring).
Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, 3, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Statement of Interest]. I thank Drew S.
Days, III, Solicitor General of the United States, for providing me with a copy of
the Statement of Interest.
Simon, supra note 43, at 76.
' From Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap-
pij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), in which, after the Department of State pub-
lished a letter to plaintiffs attorney from the Department's Acting Legal Adviser
indicating that the Executive had no objection, the court permitted evidence of the
invalidity of seizure of property from a Jew by officials in Nazi Germany.
L' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964).
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that passing on the validity of acts of the Nazis could affect our
foreign relations. Nevertheless, obtaining executive approval
before exercising jurisdiction over human rights suits does
lessen the political question problem, particularly when, as is
often the case, the defendant is no longer in power.
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the court finds that it is a
seriously inconvenient forum and that the interests of the
parties, the public or both will be served best by remitting the
plaintiff to another available and more convenient forum."'
The plaintiffs choice of forum is ordinarily entitled to great
deference and the defendant has a difficult burden to meet
convincing the trial court to exercise its discretion to order a
forum non conveniens dismissal or stay.' The United States
Supreme Court has declared, however, that "[blecause the
central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to en-
sure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiffs choice
deserves less deference."135
In suits under the ATCA and TVPA, because of the possi-
ble unfairness of requiring defendants to present evidence far
from the scene of the alleged offenses,136 forum non conveni-
ens dismissals should be granted whenever there is a more
convenient forum available, particularly if that forum is near
the site of the alleged atrocities. Whether such an alternative
forum is available will depend on the circumstances of each
case. In Kadic, the court declared that "the courts of the for-
mer Yugoslavia, either in Serbia or war-torn Bosnia, are not
now available to entertain plaintiffs' claims .. . .""' In its
1.. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
1" Id. at 508.
135 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
1" See Simon, supra note 43, at 4 (raising "questions of fairness . . . as to the
propriety of forcing foreign defendants to litigate uniquely testimonial and witness-
based issues in U.S. courts").
13 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995); see Plaintiffs' Brief, su-
pra note 24, at 5 (stating that "[d]ue to war, occupation, and the likelihood of
reprisals, it is impossible to adjudicate these torts . . . where they were commit-
ted"). In Filartiga, the trial court on remand stated that defendant "submitted
nothing to cast doubt on plaintiffs' evidence showing that further resort to Para-
[Vol. 62: 753
1996] CIVIL SUITS FOR VIOLATIONS OF IVTERNATIONAL LAW 775
Statement of Interest, the Executive declared that "on remand
the district court should examine whether [forum non conveni-
ens] might apply here." ' There may be some areas of
Bosnia-Herzegovina where suit might be brought. In Banja
Luka, the largest city in the Serb territories of Bosnia, a news-
paper article reports that a court "has issued 90 orders rein-
stating minorities to their homes, and 200 more lawsuits are
pending."' The same article, however, goes on to report that
police have refused to enforce the court orders and that "a
Muslim was beaten in the courthouse itself [by Serb police
officers] moments after he obtained a court order giving him
back his apartment."140
The TVPA provides that "[a] court shall decline to hear a
claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted
adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred."' The Report of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary states:
The procedural practice of international human rights tribunals
generally holds that the respondent has the burden of raising the
nonexhaustion of remedies as an affirmative defense and must show
that domestic remedies exist that the claimant did not use. Once the
defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not been
exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing
that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly pro-
longed, inadequate, or obviously futile. The ultimate burden of proof
and persuasion on the issue of exhaustion of remedies, however, lies
with the defendant."
guayan courts would be futile." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).Statement of Interest, supra note 129, at 18.
Barbara Demick, Bosnia Court Functions, but Police Still Laching, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 9, 1996, at A21 (also available on ALLNEWS, 1996
WL 3432317).
140 Id.
*" TVPA, supra note 9, § 2(b).
142 Senate Report, supra note 87, at 10.
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D. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Under international law, foreign heads of state4 3 and, to
a lesser extent, diplomatic' and consular 4 ' agents of for-
eign governments are immune from civil suit. Are other offi-
cials of foreign governments entitled to cloak themselves with
the sovereign immunity of their states to avoid suit under
ATCA and TVPA? The FSIA defines a "foreign state" to include
"a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state."46 "Agency or instrumen-
tality" is defined as "any entity (1) which is a separate legal
person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof."'47 This language does
not appear to be applicable to an individual. 4 ' In Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,' which held that
the FSIA barred suit against Argentina, the Court remarked
that Filartiga, which permitted suit under the ATCA, was a
suit "against a Paraguayan police official for torture; the Para-
guayan Government was not joined as a defendant."15 This
observation suggests that the Court does not consider the FSIA
applicable to individuals.'5 '
" See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding Presi-
dent of Haiti immune from suit under ATCA or TVPA).
'4 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464 (stating immunity of foreign diplo-
matic agents).
14" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 465 (stating immunity of foreign consular
personnel).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994).
147 Id. § 1603(b).
, See House Report, supra note 84, at 5 (stating that "[wihile sovereign immu-
nity would not generally be an available defense, nothing in the TVPA overrides
the doctrines of diplomatic and head of state immunity"); Blum & Steinhardt,
supra note 64, at 107 (stating that "[tihere is no indication in the legislative histo-
ry of the FSIA that individuals would be entitled to sovereign immunity");
Lininger, supra note 70, at 186 (stating that the language of the FSIA "does not
contemplate the inclusion of human beings under the rubric of 'foreign state").
'49 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
1.. Id. at 436 n.4.
... Cf. Fitzpatrick, supra note 78, at 510 (stating that this passage indicates
that the FSIA does not apply to former officials).
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In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank,' however, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a suit against a member of
a Philippine presidential commission. The court held that the
defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity for acts in his
capacity as a member of the commission, finding that the FSIA
is "ambiguous as to its extension to individual foreign offi-
cials."'" The opinion stated that the FSTA should cover indi-
viduals operating in their official capacity, because otherwise it
would omit the common law immunity of officials that existed
before the Act took effect.'
The court misunderstood the pre-FSIA law concerning
immunity of foreign officials. The Second Restatement of For-
eign Relations states that
[t]he immunity of a foreign state... extends to ... (b) its head of
state and any person designated by him as a member of his official
party... [and] (f) any other public minister, official, or agent of the
state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if the
effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law
against the state.'"
The Restatement emphasizes that
[plublic ministers, officials, or agents of a state... do not have im-
munity from personal liability even for acts carried out in their
official capacity, unless the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be
to enforce a rule against the foreign state or unless they have one of
the specialized immunities referred to above [diplomatic and con-
sular officials, and representatives to international organiza-
tions]. 6
As an illustration of when permitting suit against a foreign
official "would be to enforce a rule against the foreign state,"
the Restatement provides the following:
X, an official of the defense ministry of state A, enters into a con-
tract in state B with Y for the purchase of supplies for the armed
forces of A. A disagreement arises under the contract and Y brings
1- 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
11 Id. at 1101.
" Id. at 1102; see Senate Report, supra note 87, at 8 (stating that "[t]o avoid
liability by invoking the FSIA, a former official would have to prove an agency
relationship to a state").
'0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 66 (1962).
1 Id. at cmt. b.
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suit in B against X as an individual, seeking to compel him to apply
certain funds of A in his possession to satisfy obligations of A under
the contract. X is entitled to the immunity of A.
157
Thus, before the FSIA, foreign officials could cloak themselves
in the immunity of their state only if the suit would have the
effect of enforcing liability against the state itself.
If the FSIA did apply to individuals, it would all but fore-
close suit against foreign officials under the ATCA or the
TVPA if the officials' acts were authorized.15 Argentine Re-
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.'59 held that suit could
be brought under the ATCA against a foreign government only
if one of the FSIA exceptions to sovereign immunity ap-
plied. 6 ' The Senate Report states that the TVPA is also sub-
ject to the FSIA."'6 The FSIA permits suits for torts only if
the harm occurs "in the United States."6 ' Moreover, abuse of
police power, if authorized, would likely be considered perfor-
mance of "a discretionary function" and thus result in immuni-
ty from tort liability under the FSIA.'63 Furthermore, the
... Id. at illus. 2.
I" If the acts were not authorized, the immunity would be lost. See In re Es-
tate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995) (holding that former President Marcos is
not entitled to immunity because his acts of torture and execution were not autho-
rized); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972 (1993) (holding that Marcos' daughter is not
entitled to immunity because her act of killing by torture was not performed in
her official capacity); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175 (D. Mass. 1995)
(stating that it is not necessary to decide whether the First Circuit would follow
the Ninth in holding the FSIA applicable to individuals because the defendant's
acts were beyond the scope of his authority); Senate Report, supra note 87, at 8;
Steinhardt, supra note 98, at 87.
159 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
' Id. at 434; cf. Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the United States can be sued under the ATCA only as
permitted in the Federal Tort Claims Act), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 955 (1992);
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the
ATCA does not waive the sovereign immunity of the president).
.61 Senate Report, supra note 87, at 7.
16 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994).
"' 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1994); (stating that suit may not be brought for
"any claim based upon . . . a discretionary function"); cf. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,
507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) (holding that suit for injuries to an employee of a gov-
ernment hospital suffered as a result of arrest and alleged mistreatment in prison
was not "based on a commercial activity" within the meaning of section 1605(a)(2)
because the conduct was "peculiarly sovereign in nature").
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Ninth Circuit has rejected a claim that a violation of human
rights effects a waiver of sovereign immunity within the mean-
ing of section 1605(a)(1) " of the FSIA.'"
If the Ninth Circuit is correct that the FSIA applies to
individuals 6 ' and therefore there is ATCA or TVPA liability
only if the acts are not authorized,"6 an outlaw state could
cloak its officials with immunity. Rather than risking this
result or playing the game of declaring acts of a high official
not within the scope of his or her authority, it would be prefer-
able to amend the FSIA and provide an express exception for
violations of human rights.s It is better still to hold that the
FSIA does not apply to individuals. Thus, if persons like
Karadzic are not entitled to head of state immunity, their con-
duct is not immune from civil redress even though authorized
by a recognized government.
V. CHOICE OF LAW
When a defendant has committed a tort in violation of the
law of nations, how does the court select the law to determine
which elements of harm are compensable and whether punitive
damages are recoverable? There are four major possibilities: (1)
use a choice-of-law rule to select the tort law of some state or
country, (2) use choice-of-law analysis to select the proper law,
but reject that law when incompatible with international law;
(3) fashion new tort law from standards of international law;
(4) fashion new tort law as a matter of federal common law.
With a minor exception," the preferable approach is to
select the appropriate law7 ' by a federal choice-of-law rule
based on the "most significant relationship" approach of the
16 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994).
16 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993).
1 Chuidian v. Philippine Nal Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). For dis-
cussion, see supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
16 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161 See Finkelstein, supra note 40, at 275-76 (stating that "[a] more coherent
solution ... would be to extend the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA").
16 See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
o See Caste, supra note 11, at 487 (stating that "[a) few courts have indicated
that foreign domestic law may control cases under section 1350, and this construc-
tion is consistent with the statute's plain meaning').
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Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. The law selected
to determine what elements of harm, such as pain and suffer-
ing, are compensable, and whether punitive damages are avail-
able, would ordinarily be that of the foreign country where the
plaintiff resided when abused by an official of that country. In
the suits against Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter under
the ATCA, Philippine law was applied to determine the ele-
ments of recovery,'72 which included exemplary damages. 173
There is authority for a federal most-significant-relationship
conflicts rule to choose appropriate domestic law under both
the FSIA'74 and the Warsaw Convention. 175 Applying for-
eign local law to the measure of recovery does not affect the
jurisdictional argument that the action arises under federal
law, which includes the law of nations.
176
171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1969) (stating
that "[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.").
172 In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972 (1993) (approving application of Philippine law in
suit against Marcos' daughter); In re Estate of Marcos, No. 94-840, 1994 WL
874222, at *3-4 (D. Haw. Jan. 3, 1995, addendum Jan. 4, 1996) (applying the Phil-
ippine Civil Code to permit recovery of "moral damages" and lost earnings from
the former president's estate).
173 See Jacobius, supra note 77, at 25 (stating that "the jury awarded $1.2 bil-
lion in exemplary damages against the Marcos estate . . . under Philippine law.").
'' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994); see ihu v. Republic of
China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990)
(applying a federal "more significant relationship" conflicts rule to select the law
applicable in a suit under the FSIA). But see Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil
Aviation of People's Republic of China, 923 F.2d 957, 960 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying
the choice-of-law rules of the forum state).
176 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988); see Zicherman v.
Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629, 635 (1996) (stating that, under the Warsaw
Convention, who may recover and the measure of compensatory damages are de-
termined by domestic law selected by a choice-of-law rule); Bickel v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 83 F.3d 127, 130 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying a federal choice-of-law rule
to select law under the Warsaw Convention and stating that "fiun the absence of
any established body of federal choice of law rules, we begin with the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws").
178 See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text discussing "protective juris-
diction"; see also Steinhardt, supra note 98, at 74 (same); Michael Danaher, Com-
ment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
33 STAN. L. REv. 353, 357-60 (1981) (discussing "protective jurisdiction" in the
context of the ATCA).
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Does reference to foreign local law mean that an outlaw
country can cloak its officials with immunity by embracing
torture and nonjudicial executions as state policy and therefore
not a "tort"? If ever this occurred, international law should be
used to override the foreign law on the threshold issue of
whether the conduct was tortious, but the court should apply
foreign law to determine remedies for a tort.
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit left open the question of
what it would do if foreign law purported to legalize violations
of international law." On remand, the district court claimed
to find in international law a basis for rejecting a different
aspect of the foreign law-the failure to provide for punitive
damages. 79 It is not likely that recovery of punitive damages
can be justified under the aegis of international law because
such damages are rejected by the great majority of legal sys-
tems.180
Instead of choosing the tort law of the appropriate state,
another possibility is to use international law as the basis for
the remedies available, as well as for the threshold determina-
tion that a tort has been committed."'1 Judge Edwards, in his
177 Danaher, supra note 176, at 362, suggests that a foreign rule approving of
human rights violations should be rejected as conflicting 'with the public policy of
the forum state." It is preferable to find the basis for this rejection in internation-
al law to avoid the appearance of imposing local forum law on parties and trans-
actions that have no contact with the forum. See infra note 187 and accompanying
text
178 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). The court stated
that because torture was illegal under the law of Paraguay,
[s]hould the district court decide that [choice-of-law] analysis require3 it
to apply Paraguayan law, our courts will not have occasion to consider
what law would govern a suit under the Alien Tort Statute where the
challenged conduct is actionable under the law of the forum and the law
of nations, but not the law of the jurisdiction in which the tort occurred.
17 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1934); &ce Paul v.
Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335-36 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (citing favorably this Filartiga
opinion and awarding compensatory and punitive damages, but not referring to the
law of Haiti, where the offenses occurred).
"2 See Casto, supra note 11, at 478 (referring to the opinion after remand in
Filartiga and asking "[wlho but an English-speaking judge would have imagined
that the international community would embrace as binding international law a
common-law doctrine rejected by most of the world's nations"). But cce Steinhardt,
supra note 98, at 95 (stating that the use of international law to impoae punitive
damages "is defensible").
"I See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 182 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding
compensatory and punitive damages fashioned "from the 'amorphous body' of inter-
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concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, rejected this option because
"the formidable research task involved gives pause .... W82
Perhaps someday there will emerge a complete international
law for compensating victims of atrocities. For now, because
any court purporting to apply international law for this pur-
pose would be inventing more than it is finding, it is preferable
to use choice-of-law rules to select the proper law."s
The final possibility is to develop federal common-law tort
remedies for recoveries under the ATCA and TVPA."' The
Senate Report on the TVPA goes a step further and alternates
between domestic and foreign law, whichever is more favorable
to the claimant. The Report states that "[tihe term 'beneficiary
[sic] in a wrongful death action' is generally intended to be
limited to those persons recognized as legal claimants in a
wrongful death action under Anglo-American law."' The Re-
port then opines that "[wihere application of Anglo-American
law would result in no remedy whatsoever for an extrajudicial
killing.., application of foreign law recognizing a claim by a
more distant relation in a wrongful death action is appropri-
ate.",
86
The suggestion that in ATCA or TVPA cases, courts apply
United States federal tort law, the law of a state that has no
contact with the parties or the occurrence, is bizarre. Even
monsters are entitled to due process, and due process requires
that the state of the applicable law "have a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts [with the parties and the
occurrence], creating state interests, such that choice of its law
national law").
1" Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
183 But see Cicero, supra note 70, at 380 (stating that international law already
provides "reasonable standards of liability and adjudication").
" See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion
domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary interna-
tional law"); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 (Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that "the
substantive right on which this [ATCA] action is based must be found in the do-
mestic tort law of the United States").
18" Senate Report, supra note 87, at 7 (quoting TVPA § 2) (as enacted, the term
"claimant" is used rather than "beneficiary"); cf. House Report, supra note 84, at 4
(stating that "[c]ourts may look to state law for guidance as to which parties
would be proper wrongful death claimants").
18 Senate Report, supra note 87, at 7 n.10.
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is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." In Kadic, it
may be difficult to determine the tort law in effect at the scene
of the atrocities, but it is an effort that must be made.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the TVPA, which expressly creates a
civil cause of action for victims of official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing, undercuts arguments that the ATCA should be
narrowly construed to keep from our courts cases with strong
potential for embarrassing our foreign policy. The only viable
jurisdictional issues under either the ATCA or TVPA are
whether the statutes confer 'judicial Power" beyond that per-
mitted by Article I of the United States Constitution, and
whether the statutes are invalid under what Judge Bork has
called "the constitutional core of the political question doc-
trine."' s Reasonable people may differ on this issue, but the
consensus, with which I agree, is that the enactments pass
constitutional muster.
Nevertheless, what is constitutional is not necessarily
prudent. Our Executive must often negotiate with foreign bar-
barians. Hauling these persons before our courts in ATCA and
TVPA actions is likely to make those negotiations even more
difficult. A statement from the Executive, such as that ob-
tained by the Second Circuit in Filartiga, that there is no ob-
jection to the case proceeding, will minimize this difficulty. A
change of administrations may, however, produce a change in
the Executive's position. Is the case then to be aborted? It is
preferable that an international tribunal, close to the scenes of
the atrocities when feasible, adjudicate tort claims against
those who violate basic human rights standards." Until
there is an international civil tribunal, the ATCA and TVPA
are flawed but viable methods of establishing "incredible
events by credible evidence."" °
" Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
" Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 822 (Bork, J., concurring).
*" Cf. Steinhardt, supra note 98, at 102 (advocating '[a]n international treaty
on the redress of human rights violations").
JACKSON, supra note *.

